NIST AI Risk Management Framework Mapping
Maps the ai-agent-eval-harness-healthtech reference implementation against
NIST AI RMF 1.0
(AI 100-1, January 2023). The RMF defines four core functions — Govern, Map,
Measure, Manage — each with subcategories. This document groups the
repository’s practices under those four functions using its own thematic
labels rather than citing specific official subcategory identifiers, and
assesses which it addresses today and which require additional work for a
production deployment.
Read alongside the regulatory posture and the model card.
Purpose
Section titled “Purpose”This is not a NIST AI RMF certification. No certification exists for the RMF; it is a voluntary framework. The purpose of this document is to honestly assess which risk management practices the reference implementation demonstrates and where gaps remain for a production deployment. The assessment is against the repository as-shipped; a forked or deployed instance would need its own assessment.
Framework Mapping
Section titled “Framework Mapping”GOVERN — Establish and Maintain AI Risk Management Culture
Section titled “GOVERN — Establish and Maintain AI Risk Management Culture”| Theme (our grouping) | Current Implementation | Gap Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Legal and regulatory requirements are understood | Regulatory posture documented in the regulatory posture; FDA wellness/CDS boundary, WHO 2024 guidance, MHRA GMLP, EU AI Act articles mapped | Limited to US/EU/UK/Chile frameworks; a production system would need jurisdiction-specific legal review for each deployment region |
| AI risk management is embedded in organisational governance | Architecture decision records provide traceability; changes to regulatory posture, guardrails, or escalation require a decision record | No formal governance committee or review board; single-author reference implementation |
| Roles and responsibilities for AI risk are defined | Clear module ownership: guardrails, eval harness, observability (OpenTelemetry spans per the observability decision) | No separation of duties; author is developer, reviewer, and operator |
| Risk tolerance is documented and communicated | Documented eval gates, CI-enforced with published pass/fail semantics on faithfulness and hallucination and binary per-case gates on refusal and escalation correctness | Thresholds are binary pass/fail; no graduated risk-acceptance framework |
| AI systems are transparent | Guardrail-decision trace on every response; citation set on every clinical assertion; model card in CHAI format; regulatory posture publicly accessible | Transparency is at the response level; no public-facing model-performance dashboard |
| Policies and procedures for AI risk are in place | Security disclosure process; secret scanning in CI; no-secrets policy; PII redaction before LLM | Policies are repository-level, not enterprise-grade; no formal incident-response playbook |
| Stakeholder engagement | Design informed by published regulatory guidance (FDA, WHO, MHRA); no external stakeholders formally consulted (single-author project) | No patient advisory board, clinical advisory board, or external ethics review |
MAP — Understand and Contextualise AI Risks
Section titled “MAP — Understand and Contextualise AI Risks”| Theme (our grouping) | Current Implementation | Gap Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Intended purposes and use cases are defined | Model card “Uses and Directions” section; regulatory posture “What the agent does NOT do” list; out-of-scope enumeration enforced by eval harness | Defined for the reference implementation; a deployed product would need context-specific use-case scoping |
| Interrelated AI risks are identified | Near-miss off-corpus limitation documented in the model card; sub-acute escalation gap acknowledged; generative-model probabilistic behaviour documented | Systematic cross-risk interaction analysis (e.g., how locale bias compounds with near-miss retrieval) is not performed |
| Constraints and limitations are understood | Honest limitations documented: 45-card single-domain KB, 315-case eval corpus, US-English vocabulary bias, negation-blind escalation, in-memory durability for human-in-the-loop review | Limitations are documented; no formal risk-register with severity scoring |
| Impact to individuals and groups is assessed | No demographic input features used by the agent; locale-parity scoring addresses cross-locale fairness | No demographic impact assessment beyond locale; no assessment of impact on populations with low health literacy or limited internet access |
| AI system components are documented | Architecture decision records; the enterprise agent stack; the six-node graph documented in the orchestration decision; model card AI System Facts | Documentation is thorough for the reference implementation; a production system would need operational runbooks |
| Data provenance is tracked | The data statement and data card document full provenance for the eval corpus and KB cards; source licensing per card | Provenance tracking covers only the shipped synthetic data; no data-lineage tracking for runtime inputs |
| Third-party risks are identified | The LLM client Protocol abstracts provider dependencies (see the LLM vendor abstraction decision); providers listed in the model card 3rd Party Information | No formal third-party risk assessment; no BAA or contractual review with LLM providers |
| AI risks are assessed at each lifecycle phase | Eval harness gates every code change; nightly Promptfoo red-team; eval thresholds enforced in CI | Risk assessment is continuous via CI but limited to the eval dimensions scored; no broader organisational risk review at lifecycle gates |
| Failure modes and cascading impacts are documented | Guardrail failure modes: scope bypass, escalation miss, citation fabrication; each has a test in the eval harness | No formal failure-mode-and-effects analysis (FMEA); cascading impacts across system boundaries not assessed |
| Stakeholder feedback is incorporated | No external stakeholder feedback loop; design informed by published guidance and author field experience | A production system would need structured feedback channels from patients, clinicians, and compliance officers |
MEASURE — Assess and Track AI Risks
Section titled “MEASURE — Assess and Track AI Risks”| Theme (our grouping) | Current Implementation | Gap Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Appropriate metrics are selected | Eight scorer dimensions: citation correctness, citation coverage, refusal correctness, escalation correctness and retrieval recall (deterministic), plus groundedness, faithfulness and hallucination (judge-backed); locale-stratified. Cost and latency are enforced as budget gates rather than scored dimensions. A ninth dimension, escalation / self-harm, is scored by the judge-calibration gate against committed human labels on a separate 81-case corpus | Metrics cover safety and quality; no fairness-specific metrics beyond locale parity; no environmental impact metrics |
| AI system performance is evaluated | Deterministic CI gate (a key-free deterministic stub client, 315 cases); nightly live-model run; Promptfoo red-team | Deterministic gate is reproducible; live-model metrics are not frozen in the model card (reported in the eval reports) |
| Evaluation data is representative | 315 cases across 3 locales (en, es-419, pt-BR); 5 condition clusters; golden + adversarial + no-match categories | Small sample; no demographic stratification (no demographic data collected); US-English bias acknowledged |
| Metrics are documented and communicated | Eval reports published per run; model card Key Metrics | Reports are generated per-run; no longitudinal tracking dashboard |
| Risk thresholds are defined | Hard CI-enforced gates with published pass/fail semantics on faithfulness and hallucination; binary per-case gates on refusal and escalation correctness | Thresholds are crisp but not risk-adjusted; no tiered response framework (e.g., amber vs red) |
| Monitoring and feedback mechanisms exist | CI eval on every code change; nightly red-team; OpenTelemetry spans on every node; Langfuse Cloud and Phoenix sinks (see the observability decision) | Monitoring covers the reference implementation; no production alerting, SLA monitoring, or degradation-detection pipeline |
| Bias and fairness are evaluated | Locale parity enforced: identical thresholds for en, es-419, pt-BR; refusal and escalation correctness uniform across locales | No demographic subgroup evaluation (agent takes no demographic input); locale bias limited to vocabulary, not outcome equity |
| Measurement results are used for improvement | Red-team findings folded into adversarial seed bank; eval regression fails the CI eval check (a signal, not a hard merge gate - no enforced branch protection); release notes track safety-relevant changes | Improvement loop is within-repository; no external audit findings or post-market surveillance data feed |
MANAGE — Prioritise and Act on AI Risks
Section titled “MANAGE — Prioritise and Act on AI Risks”| Theme (our grouping) | Current Implementation | Gap Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Risk treatment decisions are documented | Architecture decision records document design decisions affecting risk (the guardrails decision, the observability decision, the eval harness decision, the streaming execution graph decision) | Decision records record design intent; no formal risk-register with treatment plans and residual risk acceptance |
| AI systems are designed for safe failure | Guardrails fire before LLM (scope classifier, refusal templates, escalation router); citation enforcement refuses on no-match; streaming error events for post-first-byte failures | Near-miss off-corpus handling is a known gap; sub-acute escalation is left to the model |
| AI risks are mitigated | Deterministic guardrails, eval harness, PII redaction, an OpenTelemetry audit trail, content-negotiated streaming with error events | Mitigations are reference-implementation-grade; production would need additional layers (model supply-chain verification, output filtering at scale) |
| Incident response plans exist | Security disclosure process; secret scanning; known limitations documented in the model card | No formal incident-response playbook; no on-call rotation; no severity classification scheme |
| AI system monitoring is ongoing | CI eval on every code change; nightly Promptfoo red-team; OpenTelemetry spans on every turn; cost/latency gates | Monitoring is repository-level; no production alerting, anomaly detection, or automated rollback |
| AI risks are communicated to stakeholders | The model card, regulatory posture, data statement, and the governance docs in this section are public | Communication is passive (published documents); no active stakeholder notification process for risk changes |
| Policies and procedures are maintained | Decision-record-based change control; the regulatory posture change-control section requires a decision record for scope changes; release notes track changes | Policies are repository-level; no enterprise policy-management system; no annual policy review cycle |
Current State
Section titled “Current State”The reference implementation demonstrates NIST AI RMF practices in the following areas:
- GOVERN: Decision-record-based traceability, documented regulatory posture, transparent guardrail decisions, public model card and regulatory posture
- MAP: Defined use cases and out-of-scope boundaries, documented data provenance, identified failure modes (near-miss off-corpus, sub-acute escalation), honest limitation statements
- MEASURE: Eight-dimension eval harness with deterministic CI gate, locale-stratified scoring, nightly adversarial testing, OpenTelemetry-traced execution
- MANAGE: Guardrails-before-LLM architecture, decision-record-documented risk treatment, eval regression that fails the CI eval check (a signal, not a hard merge gate), public disclosure process
The assessment above is honest about what is a reference-implementation demonstration versus a production-grade risk management programme. The four functions are addressed at the depth a reference artefact can reasonably demonstrate: structured documentation, automated measurement, deterministic safety controls, and transparent communication.
What the repository does not have — formal governance committees, risk registers with severity scoring, incident-response playbooks, third-party risk assessments, graduated risk-acceptance frameworks, production monitoring pipelines — is documented explicitly in the Gap Assessment column of each subcategory.
Production Path
Section titled “Production Path”A production deployment would need to establish:
- Formal governance structure: AI risk committee, defined roles and responsibilities, separation of duties between developers and reviewers, stakeholder advisory boards (patient, clinical, ethics)
- Risk register: systematic enumeration of AI risks with severity scoring, likelihood assessment, treatment plans, residual risk acceptance, and risk owner assignment
- Expanded measurement: fairness metrics beyond locale parity, environmental impact assessment, demographic subgroup evaluation where applicable, longitudinal performance tracking, automated drift detection
- Incident response: formal IR playbook with severity classification, escalation paths, communication templates, post-incident review process, regulatory notification procedures
- Third-party governance: vendor risk assessments for LLM providers, BAA where applicable, contractual review for data processing, supply-chain verification for model provenance
- Continuous monitoring: production alerting, anomaly detection, automated rollback, degradation early-warning, SLA monitoring, capacity planning
- Audit readiness: evidence collection automation, audit log retention (6 years for HIPAA, as applicable), tamper-evident logging, query interface for auditors
The repository’s patterns — eval contracts, decision-record traceability, OpenTelemetry instrumentation, guardrail-first architecture — accelerate building each of these capabilities. They are the foundation, not the finished structure.
See Also
Section titled “See Also”- Regulatory posture — FDA/WHO/MHRA/EU AI Act boundary
- Model card — CHAI Applied Model Card
- EU AI Act classification — EU AI Act risk-tier classification
- OWASP / ATLAS threat model — threat model
- Guardrails decision — guardrails design
- Observability decision — observability design
Part of the portfolio of Waldemar Szemat · szemat.pro
GitHub · LinkedIn